Political comments on operation Desert Fox

Saudis for Saddam

Majority of Saudi Arabian, whose capital was attacked by Saddam Hussein's missiles during the Gulf war in 1991, seems to oppose operation Desert Fox, according to a poll conducted by an Arabic newspaper.

Over 82 percent of Saudis opposed the US action, while only 7 percent thought it would topple Saddam, but two third said the operation would weaken him. 27 percent expected Saddam to emerge stronger.

The poll was conducted by the London based Saudi owned Lebanese run Al-Hyat daily among 200 Saudi nationals.

66 percent of those asked said the military action would have no effect on Saudi Arabia while 33 percent said it would weaken the regime in Saudi Arabia.

On Iraqi intentions towards Kuwait, 60% thought another Iraqi invasion was unlikely, 29% thought it was somewhat likely and 11% thought it was very likely.

Polling is a rarity in Saudi Arabia on important issues of government policy.

Because of this and the fact that the paper did not describe its methodology, I urge caution in interpreting the results of this single poll.

It wasn't clear whether those who opposed the action would support Saddam, but this is unlikely.

(Haaretz Editorial 20 december 1998)

After three days of massive bombing, it is still too early to judge the efficiency of the strikes against Saddam Hussein. The United States, which led the effort, and Britain, which joined in, hoped to achieve three declared goals: to lessen Iraq's ability to produce weapons of mass destruction; to reduce Iraq's military threat to its neighbours; and to force Saddam to allow free access to UN inspectors. In addition, the U.S. hopes to remove Saddam's regime and lay the groundwork for the ascendance of an alternative government.

The declared goals of the operation are worthy of international support since weapons of mass destruction, wherever they are found, constitute a real danger to civilian populations. A regime seeking to develop these weapons, and more so one that has proved its readiness to use them, cannot hide behind claims of self-defense. The international community has built appropriate tools for the supervision, limitation and destruction of these kinds of weapons. But these tools can only be effective with the cooperation of the targeted country. Iraq, which has signed multi-lateral treaties for limiting the spread non-conventional weapons, has shown that it has no intention of honoring them, and at the same time that it feigns cooperation with UN inspectors, it finds infinite ways to deceive them.

But the justice of the goals are no proof of the efficacy of the means employed to achieve them. Limited destruction of military targets in Iraq may be important from a tactical perspective, but it already raises serious doubts about the renewal of inspections. The Iraqi threat is still in place. The international repercussions already felt as a result of the operation are no less dangerous than the danger presented by Iraq itself. The profound disagreement between Russia and the United States places the ratification of the START-2 treaty for dismantling nuclear weapons in danger, for example. Broad public oppositionin the Arab world to the attacks compromises American relations with that part of the world. And the sparring taking place between some European nations and the United States over the Iraqi question endangers a vital alliance among them that was designed to address all kinds of other global problems.

Israel removed itself from the current round of conflict by announcing that it is not involved in the dispute. This position, which largely prevents it from openly supporting the attack on Iraq, still does not remove it from the sphere of danger. As if to prove this, Patriot missile batteries, whose usefulness is hotly debated, were placed in sensitive areas of the country, and the Home Front Command heightened its preparedness. Israel must contend with the need to withstand an Iraqi missile attack, and there is no dispute in the Middle East toward which Israel can remain indifferent, but that is not to say it must become actively involved.

The current decision, like past ones not to participate in operations against Iraq, is a wise one. Israeli involvement is liable, in the best case, to burden the U.S. and Britain's freedom of action. In the worst scenario, it could widen the confrontation between the U.S. and the Arab world. Israel needs therefore to take a deep breath, contribute as much as it can (by way of diplomacy) to the success of the operation, and not give the Arab world a pretext for lumping the United States together with it under the headline, "enemy of the Arabs.

1-The US attack on Iraq & Oil (17 December)

The question about the impact of the Iraq strike on Iran is happening at the same time that Iran is suffering -- perhaps more so than any other major oil exporting country -- from low oil prices. And, I suspect, in the medium term, oil prices will have far more of an impact on domestic politics in Iran than will the set of issues associated with Iraq.

At today's oil prices -- even with the rebound that has occurred over the past week -- Iran suffers in several ways. Clearly, the initial impact is in the public sector, where the government has run into phenomenal difficulties in servicing its debt. But, should oil prices remain low, that should be just the beginning. Low oil prices will directly affect government revenue and the allocation of government resources.

Where will the priorities be?

Public sector financing?

Weapons procurement?

Oil and gas investments?

International activities versus domestic ones?

On the issue of oil and gas investments, there are two direct impacts.

First, at home, the government is already finding it difficult to allocate adequate resources to finance oil and gas field maintenance, let alone new capital investments to expand the resource base upon which, in the end, virtually all government foreign exchange depends. That means we should anticipate seeing the impact of field depletion on Iran's oil production fairly soon, if it has not already occurred. Low oil prices could well be compounded next year by much less volume available on the international market as Iran services the growing hydrocarbon appetites of domestic society.

Second, the low price environment is already having a substantial impact on the capital expenditure programs of international oil companies. And that means that projects of high risk and lower than average return will be pushed down on the priority lists of companies.

Despite the massive re-opening of oil investment opportunities in Iran already announced, companies have less money to spend, and certainly less money to take advantage of opportunities in Iran. So any hope of raising income over time from new investments is almost certainly going to be disappointed.

There has been considerable speculation in the trade press that Saudi Arabia has been orchestrating the downturn in oil prices. Most of the speculation has focussed on OPEC politics and, in particular, Saudi Arabia's response to Venezuela's challenges in the marketplace. Insufficient attention, perhaps, has been paid to the kingdom's other potential targets and among these, surely, is Iran. However dangerous a gambit this might be, senior US government officials have indicated that they are convinced that Iran's ability to finance activities that are deemed not to be in the kingdom's interest are central to Saudi policy today. Without an intimate knowledge of the evidence for this, it is difficult to render a judgement. But, it is clear that low oil prices do place very difficult choices on Iran's leadership. The question of who's hands are strengthened most and when, over the course of time, should be a subject of debate. What is less clear is whether the imposition of these choices are merely a matter of convenience for some of Iran's neighbours, or whether they are the intended consequences of policy.

It could clearly be argued that Saudi Arabia is also suffering from the drop in income accompanying today's oil market conditions. But for a government that is perhaps feeling more secure -- both within and from without -- than it has in considerable time, a policy based on the notion that what really counts is who suffers least in the short run and who gains the most over time is one that should not be dismissed.

2- Allies and Foes t: (17 December)

I do not know what a more subtle and humane approach might be in dealing with Saddam Hussein, but I share the regret and sadness occasioned by the use of force which probably will not achieve its ends. That said I do not see how there was any choice given the situation that has been allowed to develop. I do think that European allies of the US ought to support the US and stop those seeking to bilateralise the issue. The impasse that has developed however is very much a result of Saddam. Without Saddam Iraq would be different and different judgements could be made about what degree of reassurance is needed about its WMD ambitions. The real problem now is the same applies to Iran. It has a WMD programme but the US policy is only going to make it more likely while straining ties with its allies and reducing its own prestige and credibility. Here there is a need to ask why states seek options on these weapons, rather than treat the motivations as criminal. All of non-proliferation policy has been in the hands of arms controllers and theologists rather than security analysts. The results are all too evident in South Asia. We need a new look at those key states that have incentives to proliferate and ask what other than occasional threats and attacks might make them less inclined to do so. All the crap about global norms (and regimes) does not wash where the security of these states is concerned. It is the difficult cases that we need to deal with not all of those that have absolutely nothing to proliferate about.

3- Arab Americans (17 December)

It would not be inaccurate to say that most Arab-Americans feel remorse and insult regarding the latest attacks on Iraq.

First, I think the utmost concern for Arab-Americans would be the human cost of the attack. Let's remember the estimate given by the US administration that the first wave of attack would kill about ten thousand human lives.

Second, the sanctions on Iraq have already resulted in about one million casualties, most of them children. Previous military attacks on Iraq failed to force compliance or to weaken the Iraqi regime.

Third, I would bet that almost all Arab-Americans would support any serious plan to remove Saddam Hussein.

Finally, the timing of this bombing is awkward to say the least, and therefore, it is unlikely to lead to its intended goal. It is interesting to note that everyone is suddenly very aware of and concerned about Ramadan. But whether the killing ends before the month begins or not, I would think this would not be regarded by Muslims as an auspicious way to greet the month.

4- Why the attack might be effective?

I quite understand why people react negatively against the US/UK strikes on Iraq. The point that a few cruise missiles will not by themselves get rid of the problem is correct. So is the one that the removal of Saddam will not be the magic wand that resolves all Iraq's problems at a stroke. Nevertheless, Saddam IS one of the key problems Iraq is saddled with, and his removal - quite regardless of any fears one might have about uncertainties which would follow -would certainly be one move in the right direction.

I don't think a blanket argument simply 'against' military action can stand up. In this particular case everything depends on the precise nature of the targets, and on the wider context of US and UK policy. If the targets are specifically chosen to wreck the military and security communications network, and also political (i.e.US domestic) security 'nodes', then a case can be made in favour (given that the Iraqi regime's game with UNSCOM really has been quite blatantly obstructive), but only if this proved to be part of a more consistent policy by the US & the UK. In the past they (esp. the US) were on the one hand unwilling to give a clear signal that sanctions would be lifted if the UNSCR resolutions re. UNSCOM and IAEA were observed (so there was no serious carrot), but at the same time there was no willingness to see a genuine replacement for Saddam arise (except if it could be controlled). So while the Iraqis were kept suffering, there was also no prospect for actually getting rid of the regime. The only result of this policy has been 'containment', which is by its nature only temporary, as well as very costly, especially for the Iraqi people, but also for those doing the containing. Containment at that price is hard to justify - and so would be the current strikes if they were merely another instance of that policy.

IF there is now a shift towards contemplating the removal of Saddam, especially if it means giving genuine support to the opposition movements within and outside Iraq, then:

(a) properly targeted attacks may help this, both by weakening Saddam's control structure, and by boosting the confidence of, and support for, anti-Saddam actions and movements by Iraqis themselves; and

(b) regional powers such as those in the Gulf may actually be in favour.

Regional governments worried about Saddam have understandably been reluctant to come out openly in favour of allied military action against Iraq - apprehensive that, in the absence of a credible policy aimed at obtaining the end of the regime, they would still have to face the same leadership in Baghdad afterwards - quite apart from the fact that they would be adding quite fruitlessly to the suffering of the Iraqis. By the same token, the fractiousness and Ineffectiveness of the opposition (including among the Kurds) is in no small measure related to the failure of the outside world to allow them any leeway to give them the required level of support when the need was greatest.

There is no inherent reason why the most important of these individuals and groups could not again gather under something resembling the umbrella they constructed in the aftermath of the Gulf war, and on a similar pluralist platform. Under conditions of futility and absence of support, however, the assertion that they are 'useless' is merely a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Nor is there any inevitability that Iraq under a post-Saddam regime should fall apart, that Iran would grab the south, or, even, that Turkey would do the same in the north. The best way to restore any sort of long-term hope for Iraq and its people remains also the least predictable and perhaps temporarily the messiest one: a locally-generated, albeit externally supported, change toward a representative regime. The precise shape and policies of such a regime may well remain unpredictable for some time, but the outcome for all involved will surely be preferable in the long run to maintaining an indefensible status-quo, under 'containment'. It might even bring the US some credit, in the end.

One need not have any illusions about the US. Yet it would be even more misguided to harbour any about Saddam Hussein. The sadness of this whole affair, apart from the impoverishment of Iraq, has been that broader US and western policy (including, of course, over Israel) has pushed many Arabs towards a grudging defence of a regime which embodies the worst of all possible futures for Arab society itself.