Debating the US Strike Against Iraq

Thurs 17 Dec

1. Guarded backing for the attack:

   I quite understand why people react negatively against the US/UK strikes on Iraq. The point that a few cruise missiles will not by themselves get rid of the problem is correct. So is the one that the removal of Saddam will not be the magic wand that resolves all Iraq's problems at a stroke. Nevertheless, Saddam IS one of the key problems Iraq is saddled with, and his removal - quite regardless of any fears one might have about uncertainties which would follow -would certainly be one move in the right direction.

   I don't think a blanket argument simply 'against' military action can stand up. In this particular case everything depends on the precise nature of the targets, and on the wider context of US and UK policy. If the targets are specifically chosen to wreck the military and security communications network, and also political (i.e.US domestic) security 'nodes', then a case can be made in favour (given that the Iraqi regime's game with UNSCOM really has been quite blatantly obstructive), but only if this proved to be part of a more consistent policy by the US & the UK. In the past they (esp. the US) were on the one hand unwilling to give a clear signal that sanctions would be lifted if the UNSCR resolutions re. UNSCOM and IAEA were observed (so there was no serious carrot), but at the same time there was no willingness to see a genuine replacement for Saddam arise (except if it could be controlled). So while the Iraqis were kept suffering, there was also no prospect for actually getting rid of the regime. The only result of this policy has been 'containment', which is by its nature only temporary, as well as very costly, especially for the Iraqi people, but also for those doing the containing. Containment at that price is hard to justify - and so would be the current strikes if they were merely another instance of that policy.

   IF there is now a shift towards contemplating the removal of Saddam, especially if it means giving genuine support to the opposition movements within and outside Iraq, then:

   (a) properly targeted attacks may help this, both by weakening Saddam's control structure, and by boosting the confidence of, and support for, anti-Saddam actions and movements by Iraqis themselves; and

   (b) regional powers such as those in the Gulf may actually be in favour.

   Regional governments worried about Saddam have understandably been reluctant to come out openly in favour of allied military action against Iraq - apprehensive that, in the absence of a credible policy aimed at obtaining the end of the regime, they would still have to face the same leadership in Baghdad afterwards - quite apart from the fact that they would be adding quite fruitlessly to the suffering of the Iraqis. By the same token, the fractiousness and Ineffectiveness of the opposition (including among the Kurds) is in no small measure related to the failure of the outside world to allow them any leeway to give them the required level of support when the need was greatest.

   There is no inherent reason why the most important of these individuals and groups could not again gather under something resembling the umbrella they constructed in the aftermath of the Gulf war, and on a similar pluralist platform. Under conditions of futility and absence of support, however, the assertion that they are 'useless' is merely a self-fulfilling prophecy.

   Nor is there any inevitability that Iraq under a post-Saddam regime should fall apart, that Iran would grab the south, or, even, that Turkey would do the same in the north. The best way to restore any sort of long-term hope for Iraq and its people remains also the least predictable and perhaps temporarily the messiest one: a locally-generated, albeit externally supported, change toward a representative regime. The precise shape and policies of such a regime may well remain unpredictable for some time, but the outcome for all involved will surely be preferable in the long run to maintaining an indefensible status-quo, under 'containment'. It might even bring the US some credit, in the end.

   One need not have any illusions about the US. Yet it would be even more misguided to harbour any about Saddam Hussein. The sadness of this whole affair, apart from the impoverishment of Iraq, has been that broader US and western policy (including, of course, over Israel) has pushed many Arabs towards a grudging defence of a regime which embodies the worst of all possible futures for Arab society itself.

   

2. Impeachment & war

   I am SO sick over what's going on here!

   Not only the impeachment issue, but the bombing.

   The entire idea that any politician who lies cannot serve is ridiculous.

   Monica Dowd had this in her column and it is a lovely summary of my attitude to our Republican friends when they claim they want to get rid of Clinton because you can't have a liar in the White House.

   

3. Question of Terrorism

   I do not think 200 or even 2000 missiles would force Saddam and his criminal regime to bend. In 1991 Iraq and its people took more hits and suffered much more damages and it did not affect Saddam. Bombarding Iraq with rockets is similar to exploding a car bomb in a marketplace. It will only terrorise innocent people. I think President Clinton has lost the ability to differentiate between right and wrong.

4. Why Anyone Would Support Sending Over 200 Cruise Missiles Against Iraq?

   Could we have a good, solid and credible argument that does not devolve into all of the rubbish about degrading weapons sights and search-and-destroy missions against WMDs. That sort of argument would only work in a Hollywood movie or a Tom Clancy novel. (President Clinton used the term "clear and present danger" in his explanatory speech this morning.)

   I say this for different reasons than some might suppose:

   A. Such weapons sights can be rebuilt again and again. WMDs are part of the international marketplace, particularly after the fall of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the Russian and Central Asian economies. WMD experts out of the former Soviet Union are a "dime a dozen".

   B. Any attempts at "degrading" the military capabilities of Saddam Hussein in such a manner are targeting the symptoms instead of going after the disease. The results of "cruise missile diplomacy" will, unfortunately, be short term at best.

   C. If a state with 180 billion barrels of oil wants to buy weapons, it can and will. If someone like Saddam wants to hide a vial of biological or chemical agents in a country that is mostly desert, and is about 170,000 square miles of territory, he will likely be able to permanently hide at least some of it. No weapons inspectors, however excellent they might be, will be able to find it all. [What historical precedent is there for this "no tolerance rule" actually working anywhere?]

   D. Also, the simplistic argument that if Saddam is gone then all is back to "normal" is absurd. The Iraqi people have suffered under these sanctions and attacks for many years. They probably have some of the biggest chips on their shoulders of any people on the planet. If anyone thinks that 200 cruise missiles and "toppling Saddam" are the answers to the "Iraq Problem", he (or she) should think again.

   E. Iraq will be a source of instability and military threat for years to come -- well beyond Saddam's time. Part of the reason behind the likely continuation of threats emanating form Iraq is the way these people have been hammered into the ground since 1991. The "medicine" to eradicate Saddam has created a worse "disease". [Yes, Saddam is something of a disease in this part of the world.]

   F. What is wrong with using a more subtle and humane approach to the Iraq Problem?

   

Friday Dec 18

1. Are we being told every thing?

   First, no matter how loving we are of any of the other countries in the Persian Gulf and their monarchies, the U.S. has managed to place itself on the wrong side of the only two republics, with the most population, resources and industrial base of any two countries in the Persian Gulf - Iran and Iraq. That bothers me in that last time we had to withstand adversaries of this proportionate relevance, i.e., the USSR, in regional terms we ended up staying in Europe (on a quasi permanent way). It seems we are moving in that direction, until such time as the rest of the world community with equal or better and more legitimate interest decide to force the lone ranger of into the sunset.

   Second, I cannot help but notice that in the days preceding the Iraqi strike, the papers (at least in the Boston area) were giving greater coverage to threats of terrorist attacks on US targets in the Persian Gulf region, in particular from the direction of the Bin Laden group. Reports of Iraqi refusal to cooperate were not that prominent. QUERY: Could there have been an additional reason for Iraqi strikes, overwhelming in nature and leaving no moment for deliberation, so as to justify unilateral attack by the US, without UN approval, and only in pre-emptive self-defence?

   Did the UN inspectors or US intelligence for example uncover evidence of Iraqi complicity in the rumoured terrorist attacks on US targets, or even on the person of the President when he was visiting Gaza and Israel?

   After all, there had been reports that the Iraqi government had planned to assassinate President Bush. No?

   

2. Comment on Secretary Cohen's comment:

   I'm sad about our aerial diplomacy, too, like many of this forum's commentators, but I can't help observing a certain irony. As Secretary of Defence Cohen said this evening, Saddam has 2 objectives, to get rid of UNSCOM and terminate the sanctions. Are not both his objectives being met without his raising a finger, much less a Scud? UNSCOM has departed, and Desert Fox has shredded any residual legitimacy and international support for the sanctions. Trade with Iraq will surely expand, irrespective of UN Security Council resolutions, and when investment follows, will the US (and UK, say with Royal Dutch Shell, not to mention Total and other European multinationals?) be in any better position to stop it than it was to prevent investment in Iran under the Iran Libya Sanctions Act?

   

3. Faliure of US policy:

   The recent bombardment of Iraq is a clear indication of the failure of US policy. In my opinion, the objectives of any political and military action should be directed towards institution of a democratic regime and to alleviate the Iraqi people from their sufferings.

   The present attacks in no way serve the above purpose. It is viewed in the Middle East as an attempt to destroy the Iraqi people and to prolong their sufferings under the dictatorship of president Saddam and his regime. I think that the undeclared objectives of the present aggression on Iraq are as follow:

   A. Divert attention of US public from its domestic problems.

   B. Field testing of new weapons developed by the US and the UK.

   C. Destruction, humiliation and terrorising the Iraqi people in particular and the Arabs in general.